What the Verification Regime Under a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty Could Be Like: A Preliminary View

Publication Date
Volume
27
Issue
2
Start Page
48
Author(s)
Kinji Koyama - Japan Institute of International Affairs
File Attachment
V-27_2.pdf13.62 MB
Abstract
The .scope of a fissile material cutoff treaty is still a matter of negotiation in the Ad Hoc Committee on an FMCT of the Conference on Disarmament. It will be quite different from that of the IAEA safeguards. However, most of measures to be applied to an FMCT verification would be similar to those of the IAEA safeguards, which are defined in the Model Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153) and the Additional Model Protocol (INFCIRC/540). This paper attempts to give an outline of an FMCT verification regime based upon the experience of the IAEA safeguards system and the Programme 93+2 for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system.
Additional File(s) in Volume
V-27_2.pdf13.62 MB
V-27_3.pdf7.72 MB
V-27_4.pdf6.52 MB