Materials Control and Accountability Challenges Associated with Plutonium Inventories

There are currently many initiatives underway within the Department of Energy (DOE) to safely and securely manage large plutonium inventories arising from weapons dismantlement, changing missions and facility operations. These large inventories — ranging from high-equity weapon usable materials to low-grade forms and scrap — will continue to be the topic of much debate and programmatic consideration now and hi the near future with respect to long-term actions and priorities of the department. Plutonium inventory information is increasingly accessible to the public as a result of the secretary of energy's "openness" initiative. As a result, knowledge of these inventories and levels to which the department has accounted for and controlled these inventories, will be under increased scrutiny from a variety of interest groups. The quality of this accountability data and what this data means will greatly influence the public's perception of how the United States is protecting its plutonium inventories. In addition, the department's safeguards program provides an essential basis for the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards that, in addition to possibly other international control regimes, will be hi place over a large portion of these future inventories.* The capability and functionality of the department's nuclear safeguards program will be important contributors to the success of U.S. programs for the responsible stewardship of these vast plutonium inventories. This paper discusses some of the challenges, in terms of specific issues relating to one part of the department's safeguards program — materials control and accountability (MC&A) — to meet the growing domestic and international requirements and expectations associated with these plutonium inventories.