Vital Area Identification (VAI) in Transport: Countering the Threat from Sabotage

Year
2019
Author(s)
George Burnett - International Nuclear Services Ltd
File Attachment
a1248_1.pdf275.82 KB
Abstract
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Implementing Guide, Nuclear Security Series (NSS) No. 9, ‘Security in the Transport of Radioactive Material’ outlines that “the threat of malicious acts including sabotage is now more widely recognised”. However, there is a perception internationally that the security arrangements to counter the threats of sabotage during transport are in a less mature position than that of those currently applied at nuclear facilities. This perception therefore highlights the need for better alignment in order to continue the safe and secure transportation of nuclear materials, and the development and sharing of international relevant good practice. The aim of this paper is to do just this. It will outline what a vital area in transport looks like, drawing from INS’s expertise and experience in this area, as well as providing examples taken from nuclear licensed sites, to clarify the differences between site and transport when defining a vital area. Following this, it will then outline what the identification process consists of when applied to nuclear transport, engulfing the technical implications that arise from applying said process to transport cases; be it from varied materials or an absence of “site boundaries” and will draw upon existing processes currently in place for nuclear facilities (such as the use of sabotage logic models). Finally, it will consider the application of proportionate security measures to mitigate the risks identified during the assessment phase to ensure an effective and graded approach is adopted. These steps combine to provide the holistic approach to sabotage analysis in transport; through defining, identifying security risks accurately. The results of this paper are expected to be assistance in obtaining a more resolute definition of vital areas in transport as well as a clear and logical process of their identification. Achieving this will further operational security standards of nuclear material transport.