Observations and Suggestions for Improved Transport/Packaging Approvals

This paper has been developed from my personal experience as Manager, Facility Licensing with Global Nuclear Fuels in Wilmington, NC over the past four years. All of my examples involve the movement of Type A, fissile material, however, the observations and recommendations clearly have universal application to the movement of other nuclear materials. The observations are global in nature embracing the US, Canada, Japan, the European Union as well others. All of these countries openly report and ascribe to the fact that they have adopted the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. The materials involved typically include UF6, UO2 powder, BWR fuel assemblies and process intermediates. Many of the papers here discuss the technical details of testing and the interpretation of the test results associated with the approval of transport packages. The technical details of demonstrating safety are of course very important in the overall assurance of safety. My discussion involves, for the most part, Section VIII – Approval and Administrative Requirements of TS-R-1. I have focused on this area because significant non-productive time is spent on these administrative matters and to a degree this non—productive time spent potentially detracts from meeting the objective of safe transport of nuclear materials.