Methodology to Detect Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material across Borders

Year
2013
Author(s)
Jean-Yves Reculeau - International Atomic Energy Agency
Peter Colgan - International Atomic Energy Agency
Ann-Margreth Eriksson-Eklund - Consultant
A.N. Nandakumar - Consultant
Nikolay Kravchenko - Consultant
Leanne Wilsson - Consultant
Nick Ardern - AWE
File Attachment
409.pdf282.22 KB
Abstract
Technological measures to detect and respond to the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials are being developed. However, some concern has arisen regarding the need to have guidance on detecting the movement of illicit material that may be concealed in otherwise legal shipments. Effective identification of quantities and qualities of nuclear and other radioactive material crossing borders would contribute to both domestic and international control over such materials. Experience in different countries has shown that authorized shipments have contained quantities, isotopes and forms of radioactive material that differed from those claimed on related authorizing documentation. The risk of illicit trafficking disguised as a legal shipment requires a technological and procedural response that needs to be addressed in the Nuclear Security Series. The objective of this guidance document, as a future Nuclear Security Series publication, is to close a potential gap in nuclear security and to provide national authorities, particularly Customs officials, with a risk-informed methodology to detect, across borders, illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material within shipments, whether declared or not declared as radioactive material shipments. The document defines the methodology to detect illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material across borders and includes the following components: ? A description of illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material; ? The international and national legal framework for detection of nuclear and other radioactive material by Customs officials and other key stakeholders, e.g. industry and regulatory bodies; ? The risk-informed approach comprises: - the selection process for threat and risk assessments; - the screening and targeting processes for a graded approach to detecting illicit trafficking; and - the control process. This may include document examination, visual and physical assessments, and other types of confirmation techniques, on suspicion of illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material as part of a shipment. ? As appendices, additional information on performing radiation measurements and confirmation techniques.