Challenges and Experiences on the Performance of the First Security Transport of SNF on Inland Waterways in Germany

Year
2019
Author(s)
Oliver Paetzold - DAHER Nuclear Technologies GmbH
File Attachment
Abstract
For decades DAHER NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES GmbH (DNT) has successfully been planning and conducting several national and international security transports of spent nuclear fuel assemblies and products from the reprocessing of nuclear fuel such as LLW, ILW and HLW in heavy cargo casks type CASTOR® 440/84, CASTOR® V, CASTOR® HAW28M etc. on road, rail and sea. Situated in Hanau, Germany the company licensed for the transport of highly sensitive radioactive material owns specialized heavy cargo and high-level security transport equipment and has specifically trained and experienced staff at its command for security transports up to category 1. In 2013 NPP operator Energie Baden-Württemberg AG (EnBW) - also owner of the closed down NPP Obrigheim and NPP Neckarwestheim (still in operation) - started to consider feasible options to transfer the remaining 342 spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies, stored in fifteen CASTOR® 440/84 mvK casks, from the Obrigheim wet storage to the interim storage facility of the closely located NPP Neckarwestheim (approx. 50 kilometers distance). Based on several transport feasibility studies in combination with DNT’s extensive experiences with SNF transportation of highly sensitive material and a high public awareness media attraction, DNT succeeded to sign a contract with EnBW for the shipment of its SNF by river barge on inland waterways (river Neckar). The presentation will give an overview of the challenges DNT and its cooperating partners were facing during all project steps and the experiences gained during planning, preparing and conducting a category II, FS security transport. It will focus on two main aspects: (1) the chosen mode of transportation - a combined road / river barge transport, which made the EnBW project a first-of-its-kind, since there never had been a security transport of spent nuclear fuel on inland waterways in Germany. (2) the influence of the more stringent new German Transport Security Guidelines Road / Rail, which were expected to become effective during the project’s realization phase. The revision of the Transport Security Guidelines had never been implemented before and was essential for obtaining the § 4 AtG transport license, that is required for any SNF transport performed in Germany.