PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM A SURVEY OF REGULATORY
REQUIREMENTS OF EURATOM MEMBER STATES ON NUCLEAR
MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL MEASURES FOR NUCLEAR
SECURITY

Continuous regulatory control of nuclear material in a State is key in meeting the obligations under the Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM) and the United Nations Security Council Resolution on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (UNSCR 1540 or Resolution). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (NSS 13), also known as INFCIRC/225/Revision 5, provides that the operator should ensure control of and be able to account for all nuclear material at a nuclear facility at all times and report any confirmed accounting discrepancy in a timely manner as stipulated by the competent authority. Recent analysis from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) reviewed how adoption of national laws and regulations specifically governing the use of nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) for security can promote effective implementation of this principle and of corresponding international requirements. Continuing this work, PNNL undertook a preliminary review of laws and regulations governing NMAC in the European Union (EU) region to assess practices among a set of developed countries with nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure as a starting point for a broader global survey to identify regulatory good practices on NMAC for security. Preliminary findings suggest that EU non-nuclear weapon States (NNWS) under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) typically lack dedicated regulations on this topic, tending instead to rely on the regional authority for international nuclear safeguards, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), to carry out oversight of nuclear material accounting. A somewhat deeper review of the EU and Euratom framework sparks important questions about whether a regional authority may or should conduct material accountancy oversight activities for security when security is generally recognized as a national responsibility, and whether an additional layer of accountancy oversight at the national level may be called for. This paper offers initial results from this review as an invitation to validate its findings and a basis for further discussions on the topic.