Year
2023
File Attachment
finalpaper_132_0511122452.pdf550.23 KB
Abstract
In less than two years’ time, the world’s first encapsulation plant and geological repository (EPGR)
for long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel will start operations in Finland. The transfer process will
run in continuous multi-day campaigns and last for several decades. International safeguards
inspectorates, in cooperation with the nuclear operator Posiva Oy and the Finnish national authority
STUK, have designed detailed requirements for the safeguards infrastructure and agreed on the main
principles of its implementation. These are aimed at meeting the required safeguards goals by the
inspectorates at an acceptable cost and inspector workload, while minimizing the impact on the
operator’s processes.
With the safeguards equipment infrastructure agreed and incorporated into the general design of
EPGR facilities, key choices must now be made to determine the best way to apply safeguards along
the geological disposal process. A multisensory and multilayer system designed to maintain continuity
of knowledge (CoK) on nuclear material flow will monitor all stages of the process; this is expected to
generate a large amount of data to be transmitted to EURATOM and IAEA headquarters for real-time
processing.
Stages of the disposal process governed by the operator will correlate with the safeguards
inspectorates’ in-process verification and confirmation points, with near real-time (NRT) analysis
performed to match the operator’s declarations with the data collected by safeguards equipment along
the transfer route. This verification methodology mitigates the impact of losing CoK during the final
disposal process.
In-process verification and the inspectorate approvals are time critical as these are needed for
uninterrupted process continuation. This paper presents an analysis of the risks of real-time decision
support and lists available fallback options in case inspectorate approvals are not possible.