Year
2021
File Attachment
Abstract
Assessing States’ industrial infrastructure, resources, and capabilities is important for supporting IAEA safeguards
activities, such as acquisition path analysis, estimation of lead times to construct new nuclear fuel cycle (NFC)
facilities clandestinely, and for building a foundation for understanding the overall picture of a State’s nuclear fuel
cycle and nuclear-related programs. The IAEA has been assessing States’ industrial capabilities since the early
2000s, shortly after it began conducting structured state evaluation as part of the earliest implementation of the
State Level Concept. Over the years, the IAEA’s methodology for assessing States’ industrial capabilities evolved
alongside the State evaluation process. As the IAEA gained access to better information sources and analytical
tools, and prioritized training on analytical methodologies, its approach to assessing States’ industrial capabilities
became more rigorous, more systematic, and objectives-oriented. Reflecting on the IAEA’s approach to conducting
industrial capabilities assessments, this paper reconsiders what the terms “industrial” and “capability” mean in
different contexts. How these terms are defined dictate what activities are included and what technical
proficiencies are taken into account when doing an industrial capabilities assessment. The paper argues that
different safeguards evaluation objectives require focusing on different levels of State technical proficiency, and it
demonstrates how both narrow and broad definitions of these terms could assist in conducting more efficient and
effective analysis of States’ industrial capabilities.