A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING SAFEGUARDS ALARMS AND RESPONSE DECISIONS

Year
1982
Author(s)
R.A. Al-Ayat - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Bruce R. Judd - Applied Decision Analysis, Inc.
Richard K. McCord - Applied Decision Analysis, Inc.
Abstract
This paper describes a quantitative approach to help evaluate and respond to safeguards alarms. These alarms may be generated internally by a facility's safeguards systems or externally by individuals claiming to possess stolen Special Nuclear Material (SNM). This approach can be used to identify the most likely cause of an alarm—theft, hoax, or error—and to evaluate alternative responses to alarms. Possible responses include conducting investigations, initiating measures to recover stolen SNM, and replying to external threats. Based on the results of each alarm investigation step, the evaluation revises the likelihoods of possible causes of an alarm, and uses this information to determine the optimal sequence of further responses. The choice of an optimal sequence of responses takes into consideration the costs and benefits of successful thefts or hoaxes. These results provide an analytical basis for setting priorities and developing contingency plans for responding to safeguards alarms.