Year
1990
Abstract
Future arms control treaties may provide for dismantlement of warheads and/or controls on nuclear material. Choosing procedures and technologies for verifying compliance with such provisions requires trading-off the relative benefits and costs of the alternatives. One of the most important costs is the risk of disclosure of sensitive national security information. We present a risk analysis approach that has been developed to assess the relative risks of different verification measures, including many that are routinely used in nuclear materials safeguards. The five step methodology incorporates the relative probabilities of disclosure, the quality of the information in the disclosures, and the relative impacts of the disclosures for national security. These components of risk are then combined in a relative risk index, which can be used to choose among competing alternatives. We explain the methodology and highlight key assumptions. Key issues in implementing the approach are discussed, as are the most important factors in structuring the analysis and in assessing the relevant parameters.