The Vulnerability Assessment Process and Enhancements in Nuclear Material Protection Contro/ and Accountability Programs

Lawrence Livermore National Laborato~ and Sandia National Laboratories have conducted Vulnerability Analysis (VA) workshops at several Russian nuclear institutes over the past year and a half. These workshops present quantitative probabilistic risk analysis techniques used by the United States Department of Energy (U.S. DOE) to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the protection systems for category I and II Special Nuclear Material (SNM) facilities in the United States (U.S.). The VA workshops focus on utilizing the computer-based analysis tool, Analytical System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security (ASSESS), to quantify the detection, delay and neutralization probabilities for the protection systems. The workshops provide instruction to Russian organizations responsible for nuclear Material Protection Control & Accountability (MPC&A) in an effort to communicate how DOE assesses the status of protection systems, and how to use the assessments to evaluate and prioritize potential MPC&A enhancements. The VA methodology introduced in the workshops is now being used to provide an initial quantification of risk at each institute where the workshop is conducted. Further, MPC&A enhancements and upgrades, identified by the class participants during the workshop or as a follow-on activity, have been or will be implemented at several nuclear facilities within Russia. This paper will discuss the vulnerability assessment and computer modeling techniques presented at the Russian nuclear facilities by the U.S. DOE National Laboratories, review the issues associated with adopting a U.S. evaluation methodology in Russia, and explain how the application of this methodology could lead to more cost effective MPC&A program enhancements throughout Russia.