Utilizing digital twins for nuclear safeguards and security

Year
2023
Author(s)
Ryan Stewart - Idaho National Laboratory - BEA
Ashley Shields - Idaho National Laboratory (INL) BEA
Samuel Bays - Idaho National Laboratory
Christopher Ritter - Idaho National Laboratory
Gustavo Reyes - Idaho National Laboratory (INL) BEA
Mark Schanfein - Idaho National Laboratory
File Attachment
Abstract
Near-term nuclear industry innovations in reactor design and construction create new challenges in applying nuclear safeguards and deterring and streamlining the detection of nuclear proliferation (i.e., diversion and misuse) as these technologies are deployed more broadly. These challenges relate to the broad adoption and acceptance of next-generation technologies and techniques for proliferation detection, as state-of-the-art methods advances beyond long-established standards. Digital twins have the potential to improve the effectiveness of international safeguards inspectors by providing a tool that can: perform an accurate diversion pathway analysis, identify the pathway indicators, develop the required sensors to detect those indicators, and monitor facilities in real time using critical data streams that benefit from this safeguards-by-design approach. Safeguards inspectors are required to visit facilities and verify the nuclear material to ensure no diversion has taken place and to detect misuse of the facility; however, this analysis and verification effort requires significant expertise, time, and funding. It is imperative that inspector time spent at a nuclear facility is focused on key areas that require hands-on activities. Digital engineering embodies a deliberate transformational approach to the way systems are designed, engineered, constructed, operated, maintained, and retired. The U.S. Department of Defense defines digital engineering as “an integrated digital approach that uses authoritative sources of system data and models as a continuum across disciplines to support lifecycle activities from concept through disposal.” Digital twin technology will include a safeguards analysis earlier in the design process, reducing the potential risk for diversion and misuse and proving the viability of a broader set of reactor technologies. The availability of these unique and comprehensive data streams opens the opportunity for a comprehensive understanding of all aspects of nuclear fuel-cycle facility operations to significantly strengthen nuclear safeguards and the nonproliferation regime in general. Such a tool will be a critical capability as the International Atomic Energy Agency currently safeguards over 200 reactors around the world and continues to operate on a zero-growth budget.