Using an NMAC System Enhanced for Nuclear Security
to Mitigate the Insider Threat

Nuclear security systems are designed to protect against theft or other unauthorized removal of nuclear material from nuclear facilities. Reports from the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database suggest that most known instances of theft have involved a malicious facility insider. One means of accomplishing the goal of protecting nuclear material from an insider is for States and nuclear facilities to enhance their established Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC) programs to meet nuclear security objectives. An NMAC program enhanced for nuclear security is essential to detecting loss or theft of nuclear material, aiding in recovery of lost or stolen nuclear material, and providing information about material type and quantity that is necessary for resolving questions of theft. An enhanced NMAC program also helps to deter acts by malicious insiders, because insiders know that malicious acts will be detected by NMAC measures designed specifically to detect attempted theft. The process NMAC uses for nuclear security is to establish a system of conditions through rules, procedures, and technical measures, so that when conditions become off-normal, an irregularity is declared and must be formally investigated. Examples of off-normal conditions include failure to obtain authorization to access a nuclear materials area, violation of a two-person rule, or discovery of a broken tamper-indicating device. In a facility with an NMAC program enhanced for nuclear security purposes, a situation such as one of these off-normal conditions would be investigated until it was proven that the situation was not a malicious act caused by an insider. This paper presents tools being developed by the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Global Material Security (DOE/NNSA/GMS) for assisting States and facilities in enhancing existing NMAC systems at nuclear facilities to mitigate the insider threat.