Year
1986
Abstract
Two major crises of 1986 — the Chernobyl nuclear accident and international terrorism have had the effect of making what we all do even more critically important for U.S. national security and for the security of the world. Chernobyl can be a starting point for efforts to make nuclear power systems safer and more benign. It also poses very basic questions for our nuclear arms control activities. A fundamental objective of the Administration's arms control policy is to achieve substantial and equitable reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces with effective verification. However, Chernobyl served to remind us once again of the obsessive secretiveness of the Soviet Union and the difficulties of obtaining information on Soviet nuclear weapon activities. All of this points to the importance of developing improved monitoring technologies and obtaining Soviet agreement on on-site inspection. Terrorism continues to pose a serious threat to the West. DOE of course plays a major role in securing nuclear facilities against terrorism and has a number of programs underway designed to further enhance the security of those facilities. Just as the arms control process has encouraged the Soviets to accept the use of national technical means for verification purposes, perhaps Chernobyl will encourage them to share information on non-military nuclear technology. Nuclear managers can and should play a significant role in encouraging such information sharing.