A THEORY OF EVIDENCE FOR UNDECLARED NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES

Year
1995
Author(s)
Jack L. King - International Atomic Energy Agency
Abstract
The IAEA has recently explored techniques to augment and improve its existing safeguards information systems as part of Programme 93+2 in order to address the detection of undeclared activities. Effective utilization of information on undeclared activities requires a formulation of the relationship between the information being gathered and the resulting safeguards assurance. The process of safeguards is represented as the gathering of evidence to provide assurance that no undeclared activities take place. It is shown that the analysis of this process can be represented by a theory grounded in the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence [Shafer 1976] and the concept of possibility [Dubois and Prade 1988].This paper presents the underlying evidence theory required to support a new information system tool for the analysis of information with respect to undeclared activities. The Dempster- Shafer theory serves as the calculus for the combination of diverse sources of evidence, and when applied to safeguards information, provides a basis for interpreting the result of safeguards indicators and measurements — safeguards assurance.