A Technology Assessment Methodology for Arms Control

Ian Laurie - AWE
Jennifer Schofield - AWE
Ben Stanley - AWE
Daniel Sunhede - FOI
Martin Goliath - Sweden
Jessica Strömbro - FOI
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One of the challenges when considering verification strategies for arms control treaties, is choosing from an array of potentially suitable technologies. This paper develops a methodology for systematically evaluating technologies in an arms control scenario, to identify tools and techniques to use in a verification regime. This paper then applies the developed methodology to several technologies, NQR (Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance), PGNAA (Prompt Gamma Neutron Activation Analysis) and HPGe (High Purity Germanium), to test their application in identified use cases within a verified dismantlement scenario. The methodology formed in this work has proven able to show where technologies may encounter challenges in a defined verification regime. The methodology across the three technologies explored was found to be generally applicable. As developing technologies have been considered during this work, such as that of NQR, the assessed technology is not assumed to be a piece of COTS (Commercial Off The Shelf) equipment. Instead, the assessment corresponds to the capabilities of a well-engineered application utilising the technology.