Year
1977
Abstract
To make up a rational and reasonable international safeguards system, a variety of criteria must be taken into account. Inter alia, consistency or impartiality between facilities, and optimal ity based on cost/effectiveness are of great importance. This paper provides a model to formulate these criteria, particularly in case of an inspection plan for a nuclear materials accounting system. In the model, cost effectiveness optimal ity is defined by making use of the Bayesian decision theory. That is to say, the value of information obtained from inspection is assessed in monetary terms and the net gain of observations (the value of information minus the cost of inspection) is maximized to determine an optimal inspection plan. In order to assess the information values in monetary terms, a utility function must be difined with respect to inspection effort. For this purpose, the optimization model introduces an incentive-tax system, which represents hypothetically the game-theoretical aspect between an inspection authority (inspector) and each facility (operator). The way to give the values of incentive and tax is not unique but rather redundant. This paper, however, suggests that the other criterion, i.e., consistency between facilities should be taken into consideration in this respect, and that the concept of total critical time is useful for expressing that criterion.