Year
1985
Abstract
In the past few years, discussions have taken place in several international forums on how to make a better allocation of IAEA' s resources to cope with both more and larger industrial bulk handling facilities. These must be safeguarded in the future while a high level of confidence in these safeguards is maintained. As mentioned in paragraph 28 of INFCIRC/ 153 (corrected), \"assurance\" and \"deterrence\" are two key words in the discussions and it could be interesting to come back to their meaning. What is \"assurance\" ? Is it only the mathematical assurance with a high probability of detection of diversion and a low level of false alarm of quantified goals for significant quantities and timeliness? Is this assurance of detection the only objective for international safeguards ? Concerning the concept of \"mutual assurance\" of non -diver s ion which is obtained mainly through a large \"cooperation\" between states and IAEA, it se_e_m_s_ important _ to determirue -the limits - of this cooperation as far as an excessive cooperation could be prejudicial to this \"mutual assurance\". The concept of \"deterrence\" within the statute of IAEA is also the topic of many discussions. What is the relationship between assurance and deterrence and on which one is the emphasis to be put ? What are the objectives of safeguards and what can be imagined to reach them with a better cost/effective use of the agency's resources ?