Sabotage Target Idendification Methodology

A well-proven technique for analyzing complex industrial facilities is described that identifies scenarios for sabotage targets and target areas. This fault-tree-based technique can be used to systematically analyze an entire facility and yield easily understandable results to help provide the maximum security protection with the minimum expenditure. The methodology was developed for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and applied to all NRC-licensed reactors in the US to assure the NRC that the plants were protected adequately against sabotage. The methodology also has been applied at Cape Kennedy for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which demonstrates the methodology's flexibility for use in nonnuclear facilities. The methodology allows the analyst to focus quickly on the minimum number of areas that must be protected so that the maximum protection is provided at the minimum cost. The fault-tree approach used in this methodology can be applied to a wide spectrum of problems. The analyst develops the fault/event tree by starting with the \"successful\" sabotage event, such as a radiological or chemical release in the case of the NRC or a launch delay in the case of NASA, and ending with the specific components within the system whose failure would lead to the undesired event.