Sabotage Assessment

Year
1992
Author(s)
Neil R. Zack - Los Alamos National Laboratory
H. R. Martin - U. S. Department of Energy
D.A. Myers - U.S. Department of Energy
Abstract
Protecting facilities and hazardous materials against acts of sabotage is a high priority of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Sabotage incidents at DOE facilities may have environmental, public, or employee health and safety consequences, and may adversely impact program operations and national security. Safeguards and security program planning and inspection/ evaluation activities identified the need for more definitive guidance on radiological sabotage, and evaluation of potential radiological sabotage threats, consequences, and mitigation/prevention. A task group representing a wide range of Headquarters programmatic interests met from November 1991 through January 1992 to review the adequacy of existing DOE policy and guidance relating to the evaluation of and development of protection requirements for radiological and toxicological sabotage and to develop revised guidance for implementation at DOE facilities. This paper will discuss the work conducted by the task group and the guidance that has been promulgated by DOE for assessing potential radiological and toxicological sabotage events.