The Role of Regional Systems in International Nonproliferation Safeguards

Year
1993
Author(s)
W. Gmelin - Commission of the European Communities
Abstract
In 1990 the IAEA spent some 80%, of its safeguards resources in countries or regions where the probability of diversion, i.e. of breaching the NPT is low, or non-existent. This paper discusses possible causes for such an allocation of IAEA resources, possible changes as well as the dilemma that the political concept of Nondiscrimination has adversely affected the achievement of the political objectives of Non-Proliferation the latter comprising discriminatory elements by definition. Possible solutions to this dilemma, while observing that the diversion probabilities are unequally distributed worldwide, include the necessary measures defined to strengthen IAEA safeguards through universal reporting of nuclear materials and equipment but also the decentralization of non-proliferation responsibilities to State systems and/or Regional safeguards systems. The paper discusses, following the presentation of the well-known five criteria for the determination of the relative importance of a regional safeguards system, various arguments pro and against the taking into account of and the reliance on State systems compared with regional systems in non-proliferation safeguards.