REMOTE NEAR REAL-TIME DATA ANALYSIS AND
DECISION-MAKING IN EPGR SAFEGUARDS – RISK ANALYSIS

Year
2023
Author(s)
Mentor MURTEZI - European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy
Ali Zein - European Commission
Juha Pekkarinen - European Commission
C. Koutsoyannopoulos - European Commission – Directorate-General for Energy Directorate E – Nuclear Safeguards
Andreas Smejkal - European Commission
P. TURZAK - European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy
Vitor Sequeira - European Commission, Joint Research Centre
Erik Wolfart - European Commission, Joint Research Centre
Courtney Ames - International Atomic Energy Agency
Joshua Emmer - International Atomic Energy Agency
Angelo Antonio Alessandrello - International Atomic Energy Agency
Kirill Khrustalev - International Atomic Energy Agency
Romano Plenteda - International Atomic Energy Agency
Maria E. Lahti - Posiva, Olkiluoto, Finland
S. MUSTONEN - Posiva Oy
Marko Hämäläinen - Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, STUK
Mikael Moring - Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority - STUK
Olli Okko - STUK – Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
Tapani P. Honkamaa - STUK - Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
Topi Tupasela - Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority - STUK
File Attachment
Abstract
In less than two years’ time, the world’s first encapsulation plant and geological repository (EPGR) for long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel will start operations in Finland. The transfer process will run in continuous multi-day campaigns and last for several decades. International safeguards inspectorates, in cooperation with the nuclear operator Posiva Oy and the Finnish national authority STUK, have designed detailed requirements for the safeguards infrastructure and agreed on the main principles of its implementation. These are aimed at meeting the required safeguards goals by the inspectorates at an acceptable cost and inspector workload, while minimizing the impact on the operator’s processes. With the safeguards equipment infrastructure agreed and incorporated into the general design of EPGR facilities, key choices must now be made to determine the best way to apply safeguards along the geological disposal process. A multisensory and multilayer system designed to maintain continuity of knowledge (CoK) on nuclear material flow will monitor all stages of the process; this is expected to generate a large amount of data to be transmitted to EURATOM and IAEA headquarters for real-time processing. Stages of the disposal process governed by the operator will correlate with the safeguards inspectorates’ in-process verification and confirmation points, with near real-time (NRT) analysis performed to match the operator’s declarations with the data collected by safeguards equipment along the transfer route. This verification methodology mitigates the impact of losing CoK during the final disposal process. In-process verification and the inspectorate approvals are time critical as these are needed for uninterrupted process continuation. This paper presents an analysis of the risks of real-time decision support and lists available fallback options in case inspectorate approvals are not possible.