Protection System Effectiveness: A Qualitative Approach to Risk Modification for Insider Adversary Sets

Year
1992
Author(s)
David R. Pickering - Ogden Environmental and Energy Services Company
Abstract
Consideration of quantitative elements of a protection systems effectiveness may reveal only part of the picture that is true system effectiveness. If we had modeled the Battle of Argincourt prior to the event, using only quantitative elements of the battle, we would have been certain that King Henry V would have been defeated. Napoleon would have won the Battle of Waterloo on pure neutralization numbers. Reality proved quite different. Qualitative factors came into play to effect the outcome of both battles. Preliminary Risk Ratings are based upon quantitative protection system elements. For example, a barrier delay system can be relied upon to provide consistent delay time and would not be expected to joint the adversaries or exhibit low morale. When human beings play a role in a protection system they may not be so reliable. Cleared individuals, who may have authority to bypass protection system elements may act as insiders, providing assistance to outsider adversaries or acting alone. This paper discusses an approach to qualitative evaluation of risk for insider adversaries to determine appropriate Modified Risk Ratings and their supporting rationale. Two elements of the insider protection system, the Personnel Security Assurance Program (PSAP) and Operations Security (OPSEC) are discussed as representative protection system elements, consideration of which may effectively increase protection system effectiveness against insider adversaries.