Progress in Geo-based Data Integration (GDI) in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

Year
2023
Author(s)
M. Barletta - International Atomic Energy Agency
P. Bustos - International Atomic Energy Agency
M. Carey - International Atomic Energy Agency
A. Kaminski - International Atomic Energy Agency
A. Keskinen - International Atomic Energy Agency
W. Raja - International Atomic Energy Agency
N. Sumarokov - International Atomic Energy Agency
D. Tadjer - International Atomic Energy Agency
A. Yeoh - International Atomic Energy Agency
File Attachment
Abstract
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards has deployed the Geo-based Data Integration (GDI) platform for information integration, analysis, and activity planning involving geospatially-related information used for nuclear safeguards verification. GDI provides interactive, layered maps in a secure, user-friendly collaborative environment for IAEA inspectors, analysts and managers to access, utilize and share geospatially-referenced information regarding nuclear facilities, sites and other locations and activities relevant to the implementation of States’ safeguards agreements. GDI operates in the secure Integrated Safeguards Environment (ISE), and access to information in GDI is limited and controlled via the Safeguards Authorization Management (AM) system. As nuclear safeguards implementation involves on-site inspection to verify that nuclear materials and activities in physical locations are as declared by States in accordance with their safeguards agreements, nearly all safeguards-relevant information has geospatial attributes. This includes State-declared information; information collected by IAEA inspectors and instruments; and open-source (OS) information, including commercial satellite imagery. This paper updates on progress achieved in the IAEA Department of Safeguards since the original presentation of GDI in 2018. The paper, as presented in the IAEA Safeguards Symposium in 2022, describes enhanced functionalities; automated data integration with the Additional Protocol System (APS); and planning and reporting integration with the Integrated Scheduler and Planner (ISP) and Safeguards Field Reporting and Evaluation (SAFIRE). The paper also reports on gains in effectiveness and efficiency observed in user experiences with GDI for management; inspection briefings and practical knowledge transfer; structuring historical information; profiling facilities and buildings; and applying GDI analytical methodology to complex facilities and nuclear fuel cycle locations. The paper outlines future plans for GDI development and integration with other information technology applications, Agency datasets, and departmental workflows to further advance the utility of GDI for nuclear safeguards verification.