Year
1989
Abstract
The principles of equivalence and proportionality are generally accepted in the field of international safeguards, even when they are not explicitly inserted in International Agreements or their implementing arrangements. Before the NPT, and even now for non-NPT signatories, the principle of equivalence was relevant for IAEA Safeguards, as INFCIRC 66 Rev.2, included provisions for substitutions of equivalent materials. But nowadays it is mainly for the tracking of materials on which some suppliers impose prior consent rights that this concept becomes important. No clear definition has ever been agreed upon, concerning which material should, or not, be considered equivalent. In practice, common sense has been the basic rule. But technical, commercial, and even scientific realities have been changing. Before the Oklo discovery, it was evident that \"natural uranium\" was \"enriched\" at 0,71% and that \"depleted\" uranium was the byproduct of enrichment. But nowadays should Oklo Uranium at 0,70% be classified \"natural\" or \"depleted\"? Is it reasonable to classify three batches of reprocessed uranium at 0,70, 0,71, and 0,72% in three different categories of material? Conversely is it reasonable to use the same category for uranium enriched over and below 20%? Unfortunately, the field of international safeguards is full of political Taboos which renders unlikely that legal texts may adapt quickly to the new realities. Pending such hopeful outcome, the paper will suggest pragmatic approaches which could help solving the problems.