Nuclear energy has gathered remarkable momentum over the last several years as a clean, reliable, baseload power source that can play a significant role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. More governments and industry stakeholders are touting the benefits of expanding nuclear power, and public sentiment towards nuclear energy appears to be at its highest point in decades. However, turning this high ambition into reality will require a fresh strategy for building new reactors that focuses on a very small number of reactor types and technologies that can be deployed at scale. With over 80 reactor types either commercially available or under various stages of development, there are several criteria to consider when making this difficult down-selection. One essential, if oft-overlooked, factor is nonproliferation. It has long been recognized that nuclear technologies can be used for both peaceful purposes and weaponization. Over time, global stakeholders have developed a series of principles and practices that bolster security and nonproliferation, paving a path for the development of safe, responsible nuclear technologies that provide benefits to humankind. One of these bedrock principles has been the minimization and elimination of weapons-usable nuclear materials— namely, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium. Efforts to reduce the use of HEU have been broadly successful, while similar efforts on plutonium have struggled mightily. Efforts to shift away from an HEU economy and towards viable, non-weapons-usable alternatives has been one of the great nonproliferation successes of the 21st century. HEU was once the primary fuel for vital scientific studies and medical isotope production at nuclear research reactors around the world. But it also brought serious security and proliferation risks. Recognizing this, a broad coalition of international stakeholders led a movement grounded in the idea that the important work of these nuclear facilities must continue, but without the weaponsusable material. Over the last 25 years, the number of operating HEU facilities has halved worldwide—many of them converting to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel as a safer alternative—and very few new facilities are designed to use HEU. An informal norm against the use of HEU has taken hold. While global inventories of HEU continue a steady decline, stockpiles of separated plutonium are skyrocketing. Most of these increases are associated with nuclear power programs that utilize commercial reprocessing. Any further moves to develop technologies that utilize a plutonium fuel cycle could cause the mass proliferation of weapons-usable material. But this need not be the future of nuclear power, whose benefits such as climate change mitigation, energy security, and energy access, can all be realized without reprocessing or plutonium fuel. This paper will make the case for a strong future for nuclear power without the use of weaponsusable materials. With a clear business need to push through a busy marketplace and coalesce around a small number of reactor technologies, now is the time for the international community to use nonproliferation as a key criterion for technology down-selection.
Year
2024
Abstract