NUCLEAR WEAPONS PITS: THE COST OF THEIR STORAGE & INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION

Year
1998
Author(s)
M. Abrams - Sandia National laboratories
C. Nilsen - Sandia National laboratories
Abstract
This study’s purpose is to estimate the DOE-incurred costs of preparing for and implementing an IAEA verification regime for Pantex’s excess pits in order to provide a basis for identifying those operations, if any, into which the introduction of new procedures and/or new technologies might prove to be cost beneficial. Considering the frequency of inspector visitation as a parameter, cost estimates for implementing the first 10 years of a verification regime were obtained assuming the regime’s structure to be patterned after that used in current IAEA safeguarding practice. To frame the findings, the cost estimates obtained herein are compared to the cost of the routine and regular pit storage operations performed irrespective of verification. The key findings of this study are that any measure—technological, diplomatic, etc.—that would enable the satisfaction of IAEA requirements at a reduced frequency of inspector on-site presence could potentially result in substantial savings; and the cost of implementing verification can significantly exceed the cost of performing the routine and regular pit storage operations.