Nuclear Criticality Safety and Nuclear Security: Defining Metrics for Successful Safety-Security Interactions

For the purpose of this research, nuclear criticality safety actions and operations will refer to accident prevention and protection from an uncontrolled nuclear fission chain reaction, or a criticality accident. Nuclear security will refer to the prevention, detection, and response, to intentional malicious acts involving radioactive substances or directed against facilities or activities where radioactive substances are present. In the past, traditional nuclear facility protection approaches have emphasized and focused on Safety, Security, and Safeguards implementation in separate environments with little interaction and overlap. However, current research is increasingly discussing the value and use of 3S approaches and techniques across nuclear facilities and new designs. Nuclear criticality safety and nuclear security operators who may be looking to incorporate 3S principles into their processes and designs will have to interact and collaborate in new and unique ways which have been previously undefined. In order to guide and map new interactions in these new Safety-Security interfaces, it is important to define metrics for successful 3S implementation into these systems and evaluate where this process can be improved in specific and well-defined ways. This research aims to do an investigation of the similarities and differences between nuclear criticality safety and nuclear security’s’ widely accepted current standards, metrics, and guidelines for success and to also draw relevant conclusions. Preliminary results from these conclusions were applied to generate an initial set of useful metrics for defining and quantifying successful Safety-Security interactions in proposed applications and future test scenarios. The first set of preliminary results on these metrics were discussed and presented to professionals and subject matter experts (SME’s) in the Criticality Safety and Security fields to gain relevant feedback. Suggestions and concerns were then integrated and addressed to create a second iteration of metrics with a well-rounded and more applicable stance to nuclear facility operations and 3S design approaches. Lessons learned from this iterative process are also discussed and its relevant impacts on future Safety-Security interactions and scenarios.