NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL THREAT: NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY AND VERIFICATION

Year
1996
Author(s)
Steven P. Kadner - Aquila Technologies Group Inc.
Elizabeth Turpen - Aquila Technologies Group Inc.
Abstract
Treaties are signed that stipulate measures of nonproliferation, but the issue of verification from a policy standpoint are limited to the actual technological feasibility of achieving those measures. The implementation of treaty provisions for safeguarding weapons-grade materials is confined to the technology available. In addition, budget constraints require that those parties responsible for the provision of safeguards utilize the most cost-effective, efficient, and reliable technologies. Technical experts should thus be incorporated in any policy-making body. This paper discusses policy formulation for nonproliferation implementation in terms of the following issues: 1) the increasing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 2) verification feasibility and budget constraints, and 2) the existing nuclear infrastructure and technologies vis-h-vis the chemical and biological nonproliferation regimes. The most logical and cost-effective approach to policy-making should avoid duplicating efforts; thereby, rationalizing costs. Furthermore, the experience, scientific and technical know-how, as well as an understanding of the issues involved, can be found within the existing nuclear infrastructure; these agencies should inform our approach to verification in chemical and biological weapons control regimes. Lastly, a short description of Aquila’s efforts in technology development and continued involvement in policy making will be included.