Year
2024
Abstract
| Fusion is nearing commercial deployment. The number of private fusion companies is increasing, governments are investing more in fusion research, and States are committing to global increases in fission- and fusion-based electricity sources to address global needs associated with climate change. As fusion yields increase and fusion machines expand beyond just a few research and development laboratories, the question arises as to the role of the nonproliferation and dual-use export control regimes in controlling fusion technology. To this end, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is developing several technical documents (TECDOCs) on fusion safety and regulation; and hosting workshops and technical/ consultant’s meetings on fusion design and safety considerations.This paper and talk introduce Helion Energy, a private fusion company, to provide an overview of scale, presents Helion’s involvement in the aforementioned regulatory efforts, and discusses the role of nonproliferation authorities to address hypothetical proliferation risks associated with fusion. It is found that, based on currently available technical specifications, the IAEA will not apply safeguards to fusion systems that are not designed to use, produce, or process nuclear material, with the exception that the IAEA may request access under an Additional Protocol (‘complementary access’) to a fusion plant to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at such a plant. In addition to complementary access, tools exist to manage the proliferation risks from fusion. These tools include export controls and safeguards applicable to nuclear material, facilities, and activities (e.g., reprocessing and enrichment), which may be required to effectively generate special fissionable material from fusion. This talk and paper then discuss avenues for future work, such as technical research into the merits of wide area environmental sampling. |