Year
1992
Abstract
DOE Material Control and Accountability Order 5633.3 requires that facilities handling special nuclear material (SNM) evaluate their effectiveness against protracted theft of SNM (repeated thefts of small quantities of material, typically occurring over an extended time frame, to accumulate a goal quantity). Physical security (PS), material control (MC) and material accountability (MA) safeguards work together to provide protection against such protracted theft scenarios. The new Protracted Insider module of ASSESS (Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security) provides a comprehensive computerized tool for evaluating PS, MC and MA safeguards detection capability against both abrupt and protracted theft attempts by various types of single, nonviolent insiders. In this paper, we describe capabilities of the new Protracted Insider module including: a) analyzing different kinds of protracted scenarios for different insiders; b) automatically addressing repeated adversary encounters with PS/MC safeguards; c) incorporating detection probabilities for MA activities that can recur when theft scenarios extend over time; and d) displaying detection probabilities in both graphical and tabular form as a function of time elapsed since initiation of the theft. We'll also describe our plans for releasing this new ASSESS module, as well as further capability enhancements currently under development.