Moving INS NMAC for Nuclear Security Efforts from Training to Facility Implementation SAND2024-07370C

Year
2024
Author(s)
Martha Williams - Sandia National Laboratory (Contractor)
Noah Pope - Sandia National Laboratory (Contractor)
Abstract

Over the past five years, NNSA’s Office of International Nuclear Security has developed and presented training courses and workshops (both virtual and in-person) to assist its international partners in enhancing their nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) programs to support nuclear security. The next step in this effort is to move beyond training and to assist partners in implementing NMAC for nuclear security at the facility level. This paper addresses the importance of using NMAC for nuclear security to mitigate the insider threat and to resolve indications of possible loss of nuclear material or theft. It describes tools developed for assisting partner countries and facilities in those countries to enhance their NMAC programs to support nuclear security. This includes providing SMEs to review and assist partner countries in developing national regulations and guidance for NMAC for nuclear security; assisting facilities to develop NMAC Plans that address NMAC for nuclear security and its role in insider threat mitigation; and assisting facilities to design and install NMAC system elements for control of nuclear material, such as use of the two-person rule, use of tamper-indicating devices and development of TID programs, use of authorization and control of access to nuclear material, programs for identifying and investigating NMAC irregularities, and other NMAC system components described in IAEA documents NSS 25-G and 32-T.