Methods for Including Mitigation Actions and Plant Behavior into Physical
Security for Optimization - Initial Outcomes

Existing physical security evaluations often define the win criteria associated with adversaries achieving their objective(s). There is a desire to add additional features, such as operator procedures, or after-attack mitigation options, such as FLEX equipment, but these are currently limited because methods to easily evaluate these factors have not been not available or are difficult to validate and credit. Additionally, fixed data for the thermal hydraulics is typically used in determining core damage, where it would be optimal to account for when pieces of equipment are hit versus attack detection time. A less conservative approach accounting for these factors can make a significant difference in whether attack scenarios cause core damage to a plant and could allow for a reduction in security force. Recent work in the Light Water Reactor Sustainability program has proposed and developed a more inclusive method to model, simulate, and verify the use of operator procedures, force-on-force simulation, and thermal hydraulics, using a dynamic framework. This method is called MASS-DEF (modeling and analysis for safety and security using dynamic EMRALD framework). This paper discusses developing a generic model and the general insights obtained by applying the model and MASS-DEF method to a U.S. nuclear power facility’s physical security plan.