Year
1998
Abstract
The practical difficulties in achieving effective safeguards on large bulk-handling facilities are illustrated by the operating history of the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF) in Japan. The PFPF experience demonstrates how losses of plutonium to process hold-up and poorly characterized waste streams have a non-trivial impact on the ability of the IAEA to verify the nondiversion of significant quantities of fissile material with confidence. A multi-year, $100-million effort to reduce the plutonium holdup inventory from approximately 70 to less than 10 kilograms, and to modify the process equipment to reduce holdup accumulation, has not resolved all material accountancy issues at PFPF. Still outstanding is the potentially greater problem of accurately measuring plutonium accumulation in drums of impure mixed-oxide (MOX) scrap. Trade press accounts suggest that unrecovered scrap at PFPF contains an estimated 100-150 kilograms of plutonium. As reported by Maruyama et al. at the INMM 38th Annual Meeting, non-destructive assay of some impure scrap is highly inaccurate, even with use of state-of-the-art neutron multiplicity counters. Approaches to timely resolution of this issue are explored, including the need to develop an aqueous purification facility for accurate scrap assay and to achieve genuine transparency and effective management during the ongoing reorganization of the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC). Introduction The primary objective of an effective safeguards system at nuclear fuel cycle facilities is to provide assurance that diversions of significant quantities of weapon-usable nuclear materials are not taking place. This assurance should be accessible not only to national and international authorities directly involved, but also to concerned members of the public. To achieve the latter in a convincing way will require a greater effort on the part of plant operators to be more \"transparent,\" i.e. more responsive to public concerns and inquiries with regard to the efficacy of safeguards. Following a series of public relations blunders associated with both security- and safety-related incidents at Japanese nuclear facilities, the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation of Japan (PNC) has in principle acknowledged the need for greater transparency, which it defines as \"the effort to promote mutual trust between countries, international agencies, ... and citizens through the sharing of information with respect to nuclear activities ...\".1 1 M. Senzaki, R. Keeney, M. Tazaki, C. Nakleh, J. Puckett, W. Stanbro, \"Joint DOE-PNC Research on the Use of Transparency in Support of Nuclear Nonproliferation,\" Proceedings of the 38th Annual Meeting of the INMM, July 20-24, 1997, Phoenix, Arizona.