International transfer and operation of floating nuclear power plants: Safeguards considerations

Year
2024
Author(s)
Jesse-Lee Dimech - Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO)
Rohan Tepper - Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO)
Alistair Knight - Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO)
Geoffrey Shaw - Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO)
Abstract

Among the most novel Generation IV nuclear reactors are Floating Nuclear Power Plants (FNPPs), which are designed to be moved by sea to multiple destinations during that reactor’s lifetime. The adoption of FNPPs brings new challenges to merchant shipping and further discussion is needed to assess how treaty-level safeguards agreements must apply. For Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS), there is the potential for complex reporting obligations to arise under that state’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP).  The purpose of this paper is to raise awareness of the challenges that could arise under a CSA and AP that have not been sufficiently covered in the literature.  We then add to this picture bilateral treaty-level Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (NCAs), using Australia’s network of NCAs as an example, which also have requirements that must be met separate from those of the IAEA. This paper proposes some approaches to these safeguards challenges to help shape global thinking, but it is clear there is no single simple solution. This paper concludes by highlighting the need for states and the IAEA to engage early and often, so that all involved parties are on the same page regarding their safeguards obligations.