Year
1992
Abstract
Bomb quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU) could be produced in a short time at a commercial gas centrifuge enrichment plant that is licensed to produce only low enriched uranium (LEU). Therefore, reliable safeguards systems that are capable of prompt detection of HEU production are needed at such plants. Credible scenarios for unauthorized HEU production by use of declared centrifuges involve misuse of an entire cascade (or group of cascades) and/or misuse of sampling ports, process valves, and/or flanges. In order to operate at optimal efficiency over a wide range of enrichment specifications, newer cascades have flexibility features which afford capability for automatic cascade reconfiguration. New designs also include capability for automatic rapid removal of process inventory from enrichment equipment. Hence, continuous online enrichment monitoring is necessary to afford capability to reliably detect HEU production in declared cascades. Continuous use of fixed valve monitors and/or electronic seals, plus selective identified application of mobile video surveillance, might also be necessary. These technical monitoring means, if tamper-proofed and employed with central reporting and processing of authenticated data, could afford reliable and timely capability to detect HEU production in declared equipment. Well designed integrated safeguards systems for gas centrifuge enrichment plants could satisfy national, regional, and international inspectorates -- and the public.