Year
1997
Abstract
INFCIRC 153, the IAEA’s safeguards system for NPT and other comprehensive safeguards agreements, was completed and approved by the Agency’s Board of Governors in 1971. In 1996, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) released a detailed review of the negotiating history of INFCIRC 153 titled, “Review of the Negotiating History of the IAEA Safeguards Document INFCIRC/153\" (IEAL-275), which had been completed in 1984, and classified “Confidential”. Following Israel’s 1981 attack on Iraq’s Osirak research reactor, questions arose as to whether IAEA safeguards would have detected any misuse of the reactor or related facilities for military purposes, in time for corrective action to be taken. Americans who had recently served as IAEA inspectors stated publicly that “only facilities which Iraq has declared to the IAEA...are subject to...examination. ...the role of the inspector is limited to verifying only materials declared....”. This view was in direct conflict with the clear language of INFCIRC 153, which provides for “the Agency’s right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied on...all... material in all peaceful nuclear activities.” Because of such misconceptions, the detailed negotiating history was undertaken to establish the INFCIRC 153's original intent. Following the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons program after the Gulf War, intensive efforts were begun and are continuing to improve the effectiveness of Agency safeguards, especially in regard to undeclared activities. The Agency’s 1992 decisions reaffirming the original intent of INFCIRC 153 regarding undeclared material and activities have dispelled some earlier misunderstandings. More recently, the Board of Governors determined that the measures included in Part 1 of Programme 93+2 are authorized within 153. The Protocol that incorporates the measures of Part II of the Strengthened Safeguards System (SSS) has been approved by the Board but will become effective only through formal adoption of the Protocol by individual states. Until its adoption, only 153 is available for identifying or confirming undeclared activities in a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement. Even for countries that have accepted the Part II Protocol, the provisions of 153 must be relied upon in case of noncooperation or noncompliance with the Protocol.