INCREASING FISSILE INVENTORY ASSURANCE IN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is required to protect and account for its fissile nuclear materials – those of most concern are plutonium and enriched uranium. In 1995, the Office of Oversight issued a report that highlighted weaknesses in DOE’s ability to accurately account for fissile materials and identified a number of potential enhancements. The 1995 Oversight report and a subsequent 1996 Inspector General report that reached similar conclusions were catalysts for a number of enhancements, including establishing a working group – the Fissile Material Assurance Working Group (FMAWG) – to identify, communicate, and help resolve issues relating to the control and accountability of nuclear materials. The Office of Oversight performed a followup review of fissile material inventory assurance in 1998 and issued the report, Followup Review of Fissile Material Assurance in the Department of Energy Complex. The two primary purposes of the followup report are to provide DOE and contractor managers with an independent oversight update on the status of fissile material assurance throughout the DOE complex and to identify barriers to success and additional opportunities for improvement. This paper summarizes the information contained in the followup report.