IMPLICATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES

Year
1980
Author(s)
B. Richter - Forschungszentrum Juelich
B. Richter - Forschungszentrum Juelich GmbH
G. Stein - Forschungszentrum Juelich GmbH
E. Muench - Kerforschungslage Juelich GmbH
E. Muench - Kerforschungslage Juelich GmbH
Abstract
In the recently concluded INFCE study a variety of possibilities to minimize the proliferation risk was discussed, and their applicability in the nuclear fuel cycle was investigated. It was found that safeguards still play a central part as an anti-proliferation measure /!/. Complementary to safeguards, institutional arrangements may close possible gaps in the non-proliferation network. Technical measures were discussed in INFCE in particular with regard to their effectiveness in reducing the risk of subnational misuse. Possible institutional arrangements discussed in INFCE also included intergovernmental agreements, technical assistance and research programmes, non-proliferation agreements, contracts to assure nuclear supply as well as international and multinational cooperation agreements.