IAEA Safeguards Criteria
Everything You Might Like to Know but Didn’t Know Who to Ask

The IAEA Safeguards Criteria 1991-1995 started their life in 1991, initially for a five-year period. As it turned out, the Safeguards Criteria continued in use. Their success brought criticism. With the Iraq, DPRK and Iran earthquakes in the nonproliferation world, it became clear that the Safeguards Criteria were suited to States that wanted to and were abiding by their NPT obligations but not enough for noncompliance cases. This paper explains why and how the Safeguards Criteria came into being, counters criticisms of them, and suggests how they might be relevant for todays and future safeguards. Using a question-and-answer format, topics addressed are: Aren’t the Safeguards Criteria too inflexible; with the increased focus on providing assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, how can the Safeguards Criteria apply; in the Iran case with the JCPOA, aren’t the Safeguards Criteria irrelevant; how were the Safeguards Criteria developed, who was involved, how long did it take; were any new safeguards verification measures introduced; what was the most difficult decision during the development of the Safeguards Criteria; were the Safeguards Criteria updated to take account of developments in nuclear facilities; and, with the introduction of Integrated Safeguards and then the State Level Approach, what is the relevance of the Safeguards Criteria today?