IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND EX-WEAPONS FISSILE MATERIAL - A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE PERSPECTIVE

In his policy statement of September 27 1993, President Clinton undertook to submit US fissile material no longer needed for deterrence to inspection by the IAEA. Such a step recognises the international community's need for assurance that nuclear material liberated from nuclear weapons programs under START and other instruments, remains outside weapons programs. And it is consistent with Article VI of the NPT, which also recognises concern that there be permanent nuclear disarmament under international control. These IAEA inspections will be different from Nuclear Weapons States' \"voluntary offer\" inspections. Their purpose will not be development of inspection procedures and burden-sharing, but rather, like other IAEA inspections, to provide a credible assurance to the international community. But unlike most other inspections, they will deal with nuclear materials in a truly weapons-useable form. Such sensitive materials will require special consideration, but resources for inspecting them will not be infinite. This paper discusses the options open to the IAEA and the Nuclear Weapons States for the development of a credible inspection regime.