IAEA Safeguards and Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Activites

Verification of State declarations is an essential feature of IAEA safeguards. The issue of completeness of the declaration of all nuclear material, nuclear activities and nuclear facilities arises only in full scope safeguards, like those pursuant to NPT. Concentrating on the accountability aspect of nuclear material the NPT safeguards system has achieved a high level of objective and quantified performance. Some of the basic ideas of the drafters of INFCIRC/ 153(corrected) have been stalled. Non-proliferation concerns demand also for a detection probability for undeclared nuclear activities. Following the example of the Chemical Weapon Convention, advanced detection techniques are proposed, which go beyond the classical nuclear material accountability approach. Recent proposals for additional measures to strengthen IAEA safeguards conform to rules of NPT and related safeguards. Some proposals have been agreed generally, others can only be implemented on a voluntary basis between the State and the IAEA. The implementation will require additional resources and support for the IAEA. Great care is required to maintain the existing capability of the IAEA for a technically sound, independent, objective, and internationally acceptable judgement with available resources, and at the same time to change emphasis on certain element of the existing safeguards system.