Year
2023
File Attachment
finalpaper_226_0428043556.pdf111.79 KB
Abstract
The front-end and the back-end of the fuel cycle are challenging for the IAEA safeguards
since the nuclear materials are inaccessible in the geological media and thus not verifiable by
the inspectors. The current IAEA safeguards objectives cover in addition to the accountancy
verification, the detection of possible misuse of materials and activities. Therefore, the IAEA
is assessing States and their nuclear capabilities, e.g., using the IAEA physical model and
Acquisition Path Analysis. Whereas the national approach is based on multi-authority
governance, making social and environmental permitting essential. Typically, the miningoriented applicant or operator is not familiar with nuclear framework including international
safeguards, therefore communication and cooperation, i.e., Safeguards-by-Design is needed
between all the stakeholders.
The possible diversion scenarios have been addressed be the IAEA within the
cooperation of MSSPs. At the front-end, the capability to access the uranium resources depends
on the mining capabilities in the country, the main focus must be on the assessment of the
motivation and financing. Uranium is present almost everywhere in the lithosphere, so a
clandestine uranium extraction from multi-metallic ores is challenging to be detected. Whereas,
in the back-end the motivation and financing to access hazardous waste is minimal at a licensed
depository, and the detectability is more obvious. However, at both cases the responsibility for
physical protection, non-proliferation and peaceful use of uranium is a national obligation that
requires institutional cooperation and national control of nuclear-related activities.
The construction and licensing of facilities in the front-end and the back-end of the fuel
cycle takes years. However, during the development period safeguards measures are to be
applied to exclude undeclared activities already during the pre-operational phases. In the
presentation, experiences from the preparation for the commercial and licensed uranium
extraction and disposal in Finland will be discussed.