HAND-OFF COLLUSION MODULE OF THE ASSESS PROGRAM

Many analytic tools have been developed for evaluating the effectiveness of a facility's safeguards and security system against theft of special nuclear material by either insider or outsider adversaries acting alone. However, to date, no tools are available to help evaluate the effectiveness against collusion among insider and outsider adversaries. This paper describes the new Hand-off Collusion Module, a tool for addressing collusion between a single nonviolent insider and outsiders. Developed jointly by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories, the Hand-off Collusion Module is part of the ASSESS program. The module considers the simplest form of collusion, that of a time-independent hand-off in which the insider enters the target area, acquires the target material, and removes it to a hand-off area within the facility. The outsider penetrates the facility to this hand-off area, retrieves the target material, and moves it offsite. The module assumes that each insider/outsider pair will hand off the target material in the area where the combined \"probability of system win\" is the lowest. Preliminary calculations are made in the Insider and Outsider Modules and passed to the Collusion Module in files. The Collusion Module performs the calculations for each insider/outsider pair in consideration, and presents the results in a variety of tables, graphs, and printed reports. This paper discusses the scope of the module, describes the types of input required and outputs available, and demonstrates the computer code we have developed.