GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE FOR NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND
CONTROL MEASURES USED TO MITIGATE INSIDER THREAT AT RESEARCH
REACTORS

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Series No. 25-G Implementing Guide titled “Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities” and No. 32-T Technical Guidance titled “Establishing a System for Control of Nuclear Material for Nuclear Security Purposes at a Facility during Use, Storage and Movement” describe enhancements or measures that can be added to an existing facility nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) system to provide additional opportunities for increased nuclear security via timely detection of unauthorized removal of nuclear material. These documents also provide information about how the enhanced NMAC system can be used to provide deterrence against such possible actions. The guides also note that an NMAC system used to support nuclear security has primary objectives for (1) maintaining and reporting accurate, timely, complete, and reliable information on nuclear material; (2) maintaining control over the nuclear material; (3) providing the basis for investigation and resolution of any irregularity indicating a possible loss of nuclear material; and (4) providing information helpful to the recovery of missing material. Although this information is very useful, it needs to be complemented with a set of technical and administrative measures that provides insight about what constitutes an effective NMAC system used to support nuclear security. The US Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Global Material Security (DOE/NNSA/GMS), Nuclear Material Accounting and Control Functional Team has reviewed the guidance contained in NSS 25-G and NSS 32-T to develop a set of technical and administrative measures that an operator could consider when designing an NMAC system to support nuclear security for research reactors. This set of technical and administrative measures can also be considered by the competent authority to develop regulations and guidance for item facility operators that provide for an effective national mitigation strategy for detecting and deterring insider threat. This paper describes the processes that were used to identify the mitigation measures and how they can be incorporated into the design of an NMAC system used to support nuclear security for research reactors.