Gameful Simulations for Exploring Nuclear Arms Control Treaty Verification as a Systems Problem

A nuclear arms control treaty obliges signatory states to abide by agreed upon commitments (such as reducing their total number of warheads) and specifies the actions an ‘inspectorate’ may take to verify compliance. However, a nuclear weapons programme is a technically and logistically complex system and even a state committed to compliance will likely wish to disclose as little as possible about its programme while staying within the legal framework of the treaty. There is also a risk that the state intentionally violates the terms of the treaty, but takes actions to hide this. Hence, designing verifiable treaties and actually verifying compliance while they are in force is a difficult task. To explore these issues, we frame treaty verification as a systems problem and use gameful simulations to explore different scenarios and strategies (of the state and the inspectorate) to further our understanding of the fundamental challenges in verification with the ultimate aim of designing better treaties and verification strategies. In this work we discuss two strands of ongoing collaborative research between arms control and human-computer interaction experts. Strand 1 involves detailed, low-level simulations of nuclear weapons programs to understand the intricacies of treaty compliance and verification. Strand 2 employs a top-down, turn-based inspection game to model verification challenges, allowing for rapid scenario testing and strategic analysis. Both approaches aim to balance simplifying assumptions with sufficient detail to ensure meaningful insights, ultimately informing the design of more effective treaties and verification strategies. Findings emphasize the importance of an effective user interface to manage complex information and support decisionmaking.