GAME THEORY AND DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR USE IN SECURITY REVIEWS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL TRACKING AND ACCOUNTANCY SYSTEMS

Year
1995
Author(s)
K. Le Manchec - Institut de Protection et de Siiretd Nucltlaire
F. Werkoff - Institut de Protection et de Siiretd Nucltlaire
P. Goutal - lnstitut de Protection et de Siirett Nueldaire
N. Preston - Institut de Protection et de Siiretd Nucltlaire
F. Roche - lnstitut de Protection et de Siirett Nueldaire
Abstract
Tracking and accountancy arrangements help guarantee the security of nuclear materials. Verifications consisting of comparisons between physical identifications or measurements on one hand and material accountancy on the other hand are carried out, in order to detect any unexpected absence of nuclear material. This paper studies two different aspects of the problem of the efficiency of these verifications. First, a decision support system for use in security reviews of nuclear material accountancy systems is presented. Its purpose is firstly to represent a facility and the associated verifications, tracking and accountancy operations and secondly, to calculate the detection delay in the case of an absence of nuclear material. Next, in order to minimize the detection delay for a limited, fixed number of physical identifications, a two-person, zero-sum game with incomplete information is described. The first results obtained from this analysis indicate shorter detection times than those given by games with complete information.