The Future Role of Containment, and Surveillance

The development of nuclear facilities where tho material is stored or processed in areas whore it is physically impossible or very difficult to gain access to it for measurement means that the assurance provided by the use of containment and surveillance as a substitute for measurements will have to be increased. It is proposed that C/S systems should be divided into Category I where no remeasurement will normally be required because each path is covered by more than one C/S device which are not subject to common mode failure or defeat; Category II where each path is covered by a single device and some rerneasurement may be necessary; and Category III in which either a C/S anomaly requires investigation or no C/S applies, and extra or normal verification of the inventory is required. For situations where reverification is difficult or impossible, Category I C/S can be used. Such systems must be extremely reliable and ideally produce :o false alarms. The development of design specifications and methods to confirm performance in accordance with the specifications will require joint efforts by the Agency, safeguards authorities, facility operators and fquipment developers.