Year
1980
Abstract
It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to appear before you again to share some of my thoughts on a subject of prime importance from my perspective as Director, Office of Safeguards and Security. It has been interesting for me, with a relatively short tenure in my nosition, to read projections for nuclear safeguards needs written 15-20 years ago, in part by some of vou in the audience. The foresight displayed that many years ago was in a way prophetic. Accordingly, 1 am now trving to draw upon the intelligence* the professional expertise and the imagination of a number of our associates in laboratories, other agencies of the government, private industry and the international safeguards community to project what is likely to be asked of us through the late 30's and, in fact, to the year 2000. What should the Office of Safeguards and Security in the DOE focus on, considering our responsibility for the development of base technology in safeguards, in material control and accountability and in physical protection? What, for examnle, is the proper course given the conclusions reached during the two-year INFCE study? 1 believe that in this inquiry lies the essence of the tonic of this talk: the direction of safeguards in the future, which I interpret narochiallv to mean in large measure the future of safeguards technology (but far frc^i exclusively as we all know).